Abstract-We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player evolves according to a linear stochastic differential equation driven by a Brownian motion and under the influence of a control and an adversarial disturbance. Every player minimizes a cost functional which involves quadratic terms on state and control plus a cross-coupling meanfield term measuring the congestion resulting from the collective behavior, which motivates the term "crowd-averse." Motivations for this model are analyzed and discussed in three main contexts: a stock market application, a production engineering example, and a dynamic demand management problem in power systems. For the problem in its abstract formulation, we illustrate the paradigm of robust mean-field games. Main contributions involve first the formulation of the problem as a robust mean-field game; second, the development of a new approximate solution approach based on the extension of the state space; third, a relaxation method to minimize the approximation error. Further results are provided for the scalar case, for which we establish performance bounds, and analyze stochastic stability of both the microscopic and the macroscopic dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
E illustrate the robust mean-field game approach on a population of dynamic agents that wish to regulate their state to zero. The robust approach is particularly useful to account for model mis-specifications, uncertainties, or irrational behaviors on the part of the players. Each agent's state evolves according to a linear stochastic differential equation (SDE) driven by a Brownian motion and under the influence of a control and an adversarial disturbance. The control minimizes a cost functional which involves quadratic terms on state and control plus a cross-coupling mean-field term involving the control of the single player and the mean control. The mean state is referred to as common state. The structure of the cost functional, involving the common state in the cross-term, has a straightforward interpretation in terms of pricing and mechanism or incentive design. Justifications for the model are provided in the context of three different applications: stock market, production, and power systems. In the latter example, for instance, the mean-field cross term is useful as it allows the redistribution of the control load away from peak "hours" thus reducing congestion, hence the term "crowd-averse." Indeed every player pays a cost for controlling its own system when the population as a whole has a high mean control.
We highlight three main contributions. First, we establish a robust mean-field system for the considered game under adversarial disturbances. The resulting solution is referred to as worst-disturbance feedback mean-field equilibrium. Second, we provide a new approximate solution to compute such an equilibrium. The approach is based on the extension of the state space in the same spirit as [24] , [25] . The method assumes that any player has an internal reference model for the common state. The proposed method relies only on the solution of a differential Riccati equation. Preliminarily to the illustration of the method, we also investigate on the solution of the HamiltonJacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation under the assumption that the time evolution of the common state is given. We show that the problem reduces to solving three matrix equations. The state space extension is a heuristic method justified by bounded rationality and limited computation capabilities on the part of the players. The players agree on the internal models and act based on the estimate of the common state as obtained from the internal model. The quality of the approximation method depends on the accuracy of the internal reference model for the common state. Thus, a third contribution, we study a relaxation method aiming at minimizing the approximate error.
A few other contributions of the paper are obtained for the scalar case. The first result describes performance bounds. A second result establishes that the microscopic dynamics is exponential asymptotic stable almost surely. A third result shows that the macroscopic dynamics, involving the common state, is exponentially asymptotic stable.
Mean-field games were formulated by Lasry and Lions in [18] and independently by M.Y. Huang, P. E. Caines and R. Malhamé in [15] , [16] . The mean-field theory of dynamical games is a modeling framework at the interface of differential game theory, mathematical physics, and H ∞ -optimal control that tries to capture the mutual influence between a crowd and its individuals. Mean-field games arise in several application domains such as economics, physics, biology, and network engineering (see [1] , [7] , [14] , [16] , [17] , [22] , [28] ).
From a mathematical point of view the mean-field approach leads to a system of two PDEs. The first PDE is the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equation. The second PDE is the FokkerPlanck equation which describes the density of the players [18] , [26] . Explicit solutions in terms of mean-field equilibria are not common unless the problem has a linear-quadratic structure, see [3] , and are extended to more general cases in [10] . In this sense, a variety of solution schemes has been recently proposed based on discretization and/or numerical approximations [1] .
There has been substantial progress in the theory of weak solutions [9] and classical solutions [11] , [12] for mean-field games. Robust mean-field games have been formulated in [5] , [6] . The connection between robustness and risk-sensitivity is discussed in [26] , [27] . Therein, an explicit solution in the case of the affine-exponentiated-Gaussian mean-field game is given. In this paper we provide an explicit approximate solution under milder assumptions on the distribution, which need not necessarily be Gaussian.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate the problem. In Section III we provide some motivations. In Section IV we derive the mean-field game. In Section V, we introduce the approximate solution approach. In Section VI, we deal with the minimization of the approximation error. In Section VII, we provide additional results for the scalar case. In Section VIII, we carry out some numerical studies. Finally, in Section IX, we provide some conclusions. Preliminary results of the work presented herein have been published in [13] .
Notation: We denote by (Ω, F , P) a complete probability space. We let B be a finite-dimensional Brownian motion defined on this probability space. Let F = (F t ) t≥0 be its natural filtration augmented by all the P-null sets (sets of measure-zero with respect to P). We use ∂ x and ∂ 2 xx to denote the first and second partial derivatives with respect to x, respectively. Given a vector x ∈ R n and a matrix Q ∈ R n×n we denote by x 2 Q the weighted two-norm x T Qx. The symbol Q i• denotes the ith row of a given matrix Q. We denote by Diag(x) the diagonal matrix in R n×n whose entries in the main diagonal are the components of x.
II. PROBLEM SET-UP
In this section, we first introduce the model considered and then formulate the problem studied. Consider a game with an infinite number of homogeneous players. For each player let x 0 ∈ R n be its initial state, which is realized according to the probability distribution m 0 . The state of the player at time t, denoted by x t ∈ R n , evolves according to a controlled stochastic process over a finite horizon T > 0, i.e.,
where u t ∈ R r is the control input, ζ t ∈ R w is an adversarial disturbance, B t ∈ R n is an n-dimensional Brownian motion, which is independent across its components, independent of the initial state x 0 , and independent across players and time. The matrices A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×r , and M ∈ R n×w , and Σ(.) = Diag((σ i x i ) i=1,...,n ) ∈ R n×n for given scalars σ i , all full column rank. For each player, the admissible controls and disturbances are square integrable and are adapted to the filtration generated by the initial states and the Brownian motion, and possibly also adapted to some aggregate filtration associated with other players' dynamics.
To introduce a macroscopic description of the game, consider probability density functions on the state, control and disturbance spaces
In the following, we use the compact notation m t = m(x, t). At a given time t, function m(.) describes the density of players in a given state x ∈ R n , and z(.) describes the density of players using a given control u ∈ R r . Define the mean state, control, and disturbance at time t as
The meanm t represents an aggregate or macroscopic description of the state of the system and therefore, henceforth, we will refer to it as the common state.
Finally, we introduce a cost functional with penalty on the final state g T (·), stage cost function c(·), and quadratic penalty on the unknown disturbance
Players wish to stabilize their states to zero, and therefore we set the stage cost as follows:
where, for given nonnegative scalar weightsĥ
for somek ∈ R r×n .
The term (1/2) x t 2 Q , with Q > 0, is the cost of a non-zero state, and (1/2) u t 2 R , with R > 0, accounts for a penalty on the control energy. The penalty on the final state g T (x) is, in general, convex with minimum in zero, thus penalizing nonzero states at the end of the horizon. Let us take for it the expression g T (x) = (1/2) x 2 Φ , where Φ is a positive matrix. The term (1/2) u t 2 S(m t ) represents a cross-term coupling the control of each player and the common state of the population. The common state is in turn related to the mean control as explained next. By taking the mathematical expectation of both sides of (1) we can derive the following dynamics for the common state:
Considering a deterministic disturbance ζ t , and using indistinguishability, the mean of the average control solves the equation
A relation between (d/dt)m t andm t is yet to be introduced. We will see that both (d/dt)m t andζ t can be approximated by linear functions inm t , and therefore we can rewritē
for somek ∈ R r×n . This is useful in the definition of the cost functional to reduce the number of independent variables, in that we turn all functions ofz t as functions explicitly dependent onm t . The above preamble leads to the following robust meanfield game problem.
Problem 1-(Robust Mean-Field Problem): Let x 0 be independent of B and with density m 0 (x). Let m t be the mean-field trajectory. The robust mean-field problem in R n and (0, T ] is given by
III. MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we first motivate the role of the common state in the cross-term and then we discuss three different applications or extensions of the model introduced Section II. It turns out that the structure of the cost functional has a straightforward interpretation in terms of pricing and mechanism, or incentive, design.
We first reframe the model within the context of stock market literature. Here, the continuous-time stochastic model having the structure of a geometric Brownian motion finds its natural collocation as a classical model for the random stock price with specific volatility. This model is used in the derivation of the well-know Black and Scholes equation, this being a renowned model for the value of a European call option [8] . The stock market model offers the opportunity to indulge in the derivation and interpretation of the cross-term in the objective function (2) as shadow price of a global optimization problem solved by a regulatory authority. Under this perspective, the problem takes a two-layer or leader-follower hierarchical structure with a leader, the regulatory agent setting the price, and multiple followers, the players adapting their strategies to the new price. Two other examples that accommodate well this hierarchical problem are a production model and a power model. In the first one, the regulatory authority is concerned with guaranteeing that the total supply is equal to the total demand. In the second example, the regulatory authority aims at stabilizing the mains frequency in a population of thermostatically controlled loads by using a dynamic demand management policy.
In all of the above examples, the mean-field term can be viewed as an incentive to encourage socially desirable behavior on the part of the players.
A. Pricing
Consider a central planner that aims at solving the following infinite horizon linear quadratic optimization problem:
where Ξ and Π are opportune positive definite matrices. The term π t represents the pricing action. Thus the above constraint models the influence of the pricing action on the common state evolution. If the central planner adopts a closed-loop state feedback control policy, we get
In order to compute the optimal feedback control, let us consider the Hamiltonian function
From Pontryagin maximum principle, we know that the co-state λ satisfies the adjoint equatioṅ
At the equilibrium, obtained by taking the left-hand side equal to zero, we obtain for the adjoint equation
Let us take h = 2φ −1 (Ξ +φ T Πφ) and we have
The significance of the above derivation is that the term (2) represents the shadow price of the global constraintz t = 0, namely, the price paid by the community due to the violation of the constraintz t = 0, and which the regulatory authority charges to the individuals in order to enforce the satisfaction of the constraint.
B. Stock Market Model [21]
The most plausible interpretation of dynamics (1) lies in a stock market context. This is a financial market involving a risky asset, referred to as stock, and a risk-averse asset, denoted as bond. A largely adopted dynamical model of the price of the stockŜ t is given by
where B t is the standard one-dimensional Brownian motion, and μ and σ are given constants. Let us also assume that the bond price has a constant interest rate, denote itr, i.e.,
For each time t, we denote by X t the money invested in the bond, Y t the investments in the stock, l t the rate of transfer from the bond holdings to the stock, ω t the rate of opposite transfers andĉ t the rate of consumption. The time evolution of X t and Y t is then given by
Let the portfolio be obtained as sum of the invested money in the bond and at the stock, namely
and denote the relative amount invested in the stock by
It can be shown that the time evolution of the portfolio follows a stochastic differential equation in the form of a geometric Brownian motion of type
Note that the above has the same structure as (1) once we take Z t represented by state x t , the consumptionĉ t by the control variable u t , and for the parameters we take A =r + π t (μ −r). Here, the central planner is a regulatory authority. The cost functional (2) aims at incentivizing the players to consume or spend the value of their portfolio within the end of the game while at the same time regulatory decisions apply taxes to consumption if the average consumption rate exceeds a predefined target value.
C. Production [5] , [14] Suppose we have a continuum of producers with initial reserve x 0 distributed according to m 0 . Let the state be the reserve of raw material or resource available at a given time. Let the control be the production rate by a single producer and the adversarial disturbance be a disturbance parameter reflecting the taxation or inflation on the produced quantity.
A scalar version of (1) can be adapted to describe the variation of the reserve at time t given the current reserve and the consumed resource quantity
where σ is a given scalar. The term σζ t captures the negative and uncertain influence of taxation, or inflation, on the reserve. The stochastic term σx t dB t captures model misspecification due to the fact that the estimation of the reserves is not perfect or that reserves are random. The cost functional,km t is the sale price of the final product and the cross-term is related to the income collected from producing and selling the quantity u t ; (Q/2)(x t ) 2 accounts for a production energy consumed, Q > 0 and Ru 2 t is a known linear taxation on production. The penalty on the final state g(x T ) can be assumed quadratic in the reserve, so that unexploited reserve at the end of the horizon is penalized.
Finally, the term σ t ζ t is intended to capture the negative and uncertain influence of taxation or inflation on the production. The shadow price λ ∞ = (1/2)hz t is obtained from a global constraint on demand/supply equilibrium
In other words, around the equilibrium, when demand is equal to supply, we assume inelastic demand and take the mean demand equal to zero. Note that such a global balance of demand and supply is particularly significant in the power market [23] .
As regards the cost functional (2), this involves a penalty term on production rate, namely (1/2)Ru 2 t and storage, (1/2)Qx 2 t . The additional cross-term (1/2)hz t u 2 t aims at penalizing production when the total supply exceeds the total demand, and vice versa, to encourage production in the opposite case. The penalty on final state is a convex nonnegative penalty term accounting for unexploited reserve at the end of the horizon.
The cost functional (2) can be modified in different ways without compromising the results of this paper. A common expression in production models with a large number of producers [14] , which finds it roots in the Cournot duopoly, appears as
Here, the cross-term h(z t , ζ t ) is the sale price of the manufactured product and thus h(z t , ζ t )u t is the income collected from producing and selling the quantity u t . A slight change in the sign of the coefficients in (8) , and the dynamics mirrors a classical multi-retailer inventory control equation describing the evolution of the inventory over time [22] 
In the above, the control is the reordered quantity and the disturbance is the unknown market demand. A classical scenario is where the transportation cost is shared among all retailers who reorder at a given time instant. A certain level of coordination of the retailers' replenishment strategies may lead to individual costs reduction. The cross mean-field term in the objective function (2) accounts for the reduced cost when orders are placed jointly. The other two terms are the cost of reordering and the cost of inventory shortage or inventory holding. We can generalize the framework to any application where multiple players share a service facility as airport facilities or telephone systems, drilling for oil, cooperative farming, and fishing (see also the references on cost-sharing games in [22] ). [2] , [20] Players are electrical appliances, say for instance heating or cooling appliances, and their state X(s) is the temperature at time t ≤ s ≤ T , where [t, T ] is the time horizon window. Each appliance can be in one of two modes, ON or OFF, thus the control variable is a measurable function of time π ON (·) defined as s → {0, 1} and such that π ON (s) = 1 means that, at time s, the appliance is set to ON and π ON (s) = 0 means that the appliance is set to OFF. Dynamics (1) describes the time evolution of the temperature of each appliance. To see this, consider that when the appliance is ON the temperature decreases exponentially up to a fixed lower temperature whereas in OFF position the temperature increases exponentially up to a higher temperature. Then, the temperature of each appliance evolves according to the following differential equations, for t < s < T :
D. Dynamic Demand Management
with initial state X(t) = x and where α > 0 is a given scalar (the rate) and X ON , X OFF are the steady-state temperatures of the appliances when in state ON or OFF, respectively. Here, considering a same rate for the two states has the only meaning of simplifying future computations. Let us convexify the control set and consider the control of a single agent as the probability of setting the appliance ON, thus we have u(t) ∈ U := [0, 1] where U is the control set. It turns out that (10) can be rewritten in the form X = f (X, u) where f : R × U → R is the following affine dynamics: Each controller is given a cost function that accounts for i) the energy consumption, which is captured by the penalty on the control, ii) the deviation of the mains frequency from the nominal value, represented by the cross-term, and iii) the deviation of the agent's temperature from the reference value, described by the penalty on the state. With respect to goal ii), the cross mean-field term incentivizes the appliances to switch to OFF if the mains frequency is below the nominal value and to switch to ON if the mains frequency is above the nominal value. This model is a simple one which can be adapted to the case in which the deviation is on the power rather than on the frequency.
IV. THE RESULTING MEAN-FIELD GAME
In this section, we formulate the problem considered as a robust mean-field game. To this purpose, let v t (x t ) be the (upper) value of the robust optimization problem under worstcase disturbance starting at time t from state x t . The next theorem provides the mean-field system associated to the robust mean-field game introduced in Problem 1. The proof, which is given in the appendix, makes use of the definition of the Hamiltonian function, given by
where p is the co-state, and of the robust Hamiltonian (see [4, Ch. 4 and 8] and [6] ), which is obtained as
Theorem 1:
The mean-field system associated to the robust mean-field game for the crowd-averse system is described by the equations:
Furthermore, the optimal control and worst disturbance are
Proof: Given in the Appendix. Any solution of the above system of equations is referred to as worst-disturbance feedback mean-field equilibrium. The significance of the above result is that to find the optimal control input we need to solve the two coupled PDEs in (12) in v t and m t with given boundary conditions. This is usually done by iteratively solving the HJI equation for fixed m t and by entering the optimal u * t and ζ * t obtained from (13) in the FPK equation in (12) , until a fixed point in v t and m t is reached. Since the Bellman equation depends explicitly on the mean of the mean-field and not on the other moments, one can reduce the mean-field system to a lower dimensional system. The reduced mean-field system associated to the robust mean-field game for the problem under study is (12) complemented with the following additional equations
where
and whereū * t =z t is the mean of the optimal individual state feedback control.
The resulting mean-field game maintains the same structure as in the deterministic case, but now both PDEs involve the second order derivatives of the value function v(·) and the density m(·) as shown in Table I .
Because of the presence of the second derivatives, the above game is called second-order mean-field game. The advection equation is now renamed Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) equation.
V. ON MEAN-FIELD EQUILIBRIA AND THEIR APPROXIMATION
In this section, we introduce an approximate solution approach based on a state-space extension and internal reference model. The approach does not require the existence of a fixedpoint for the system in Table I . The approach provides a description of the microscopic and macroscopic evolution of the system when all players agree on modeling the "environment" using the aforementioned reference models. We then study equilibria and stability properties based on such reference models.
A. Considerations on the Parametrized HJI
We now investigate the solution of the HJI equation under the assumption that the time evolution of the common state is given. We show that the problem reduces to solving three matrix equations. To see this, by isolating the HJI part of (12) for fixed
Consider the following value function:
so that (16) can be rewritten as
The boundary conditions are obtained by imposing that
Again, since this is an identity in x, it reduces to three equations
whereP
For the optimal control and worst-case disturbance, we have
Existence of a solution for the (18) is guaranteed under standard assumptions on convexity-concavity of the value function with respect to the control and the disturbance [4, Chap. 8] . This also justifies the choice of the quadratic structure for the value function (17) .
B. Internal Reference Model and State Space Extension
In this section, we study the problem in the extended state space involving both the state of the player and the average state distribution. The main idea is illustrated in Fig. 1 . In the mean-field system (12), the gradient ∂ x v t is parametrized in the average distributionm t , which evolves according to a nonlinear differential equation. Then, we replace the dynamics ofm t with two linear dynamics on the new variablesm t andm t (dashed and dotted trajectories) that upper and lower bound the nonlinear dynamics ofm t (solid). In the extended state space, the state variable evolves according to the equations
which can be rewritten in matrix form as
The main idea is that each player has an internal model for the common state. In particular, each player approximates the evolution of the common state through a dynamics of type
Though this introduces an approximation, it must be said that second-order systems are commonly used to approximate higher-order dynamics.
By substituting the current average distributionm t by its estimatem t , the problem at hand can be rewritten as
for some positive definite matrixQ.
Reformulating the problem in terms of the extended state
The idea is therefore to consider a new value function V t (x,m) [in compact form V t (X)] in the extended state space which satisfies
Assume that V T (X) is given by the quadratic form
where the matrix P t is the solution of the differential Riccati equatioṅ
and wherẽ
Here,P 11 (t) is as in (19) . Note that in the stationary case the above differential equation simplifies to
The above algebraic Riccati equation is then associated to the infinite horizon formulation of the game under study.
Back to the finite horizon game, let P t be the solution of the differential Riccati equation (24) , then the optimal control is given bỹ
and the worst-case disturbance is
From (26) and (27), we can approximate the mean-field equilibrium, which is captured by the evolution ofm t over the horizon (0, T ], as follows:
The equation above corresponds to saying that the mean distribution converges to zero in absence of the stochastic disturbances (the Brownian motion), under the assumption that all the eigenvalues of the matrix [A + (−B(R + S(m t ))
have strictly negative real parts.
VI. MINIMIZING THE APPROXIMATION ERROR
In this section, we introduce a relaxation method aiming at minimizing the approximate error. Indeed, the quality of the approximate problem solved in the previous section depends on the accuracy of the internal reference model for the common state (23) .
Let us start by noting that the common statem t and its approximationm t evolve according tȱ
Henceforth, for sake of conciseness, let us denote
Consequently, the dynamics (28) can be rewritten in compact form asṁ
The dynamics (28) is obtained from averaging the optimal control (26) and worst-case disturbance (27) in order to obtainū * t andζ * t , respectively. These values are then substituted in the dynamics for the average distribution
The best approximation, namely, the one with the best bound, is given by the following least-square error minimization:
In other words, the functional (30) accounts for the approximation error using the internal model. Actually, the internal model returns a predicted common state which differs from the exact value.
Obviously, for ρ → ∞ we force Θ t to be constant and we limit to consider the best constant value for Θ that minimizes the least mean square error.
The least mean square problem (30) yields a gradient algorithm based on the following update law for Θ t (τ ):
where k is the update coefficient. At the equilibrium Θ * t , setting the LHSΘ t (τ ) equal to zero, the resulting solution is the least mean square solution, namely the solution at minimum distance from
If the least mean square error, i.e., the optimal cost of (30) is null, then the solution is Θ * t . We are now interested in investigating conditions under which the equilibrium point is asymptotically stable. This implies that starting from any solution in a bounded neighborhood of Θ * t , the resulting solution converges asymptotically to Θ * t . For this to be true, for any Θ = Θ * t in a neighborhood of the equilibrium point, it must hold
Two main considerations arise. First, when the coefficient tends to infinity, the right-hand side is negative since Θ is bounded. Second, when the coefficient tends to zero, the right-hand side is positive since Θ is bounded as well. Both considerations can be schematically summarized as follows:
] is bounded and thereforeΘ < 0.
] is bounded and positive and thereforeΘ > 0. Considerations C1 and C2 guarantee the existence and allow the computation of a lower and a upper bound for the cost.
VII. SCALAR CASE
In this section, we provide some results for the scalar case. The first result describes performance bounds. The second result establishes that the microscopic dynamics is exponentially asymptotically stable almost surely. The third result shows that the macroscopic dynamics is exponentially asymptotically stable.
A. Performance Bounds
Consider the scalar version of the dynamics (1)
In the scalar case Q ∈ R,Q ∈ R, R = R, and S(m t ) = hkm t = sm t ∈ R. From C1 and C2, we can deduce that there exist two variables that approximate from above and from below the evolution of the common state.
First, consider the following assumption. Assumption 1: There exists θ and κ such that
Possible values for κ and θ are the one obtained with maximal and minimal congestion, namely
In other words, the main idea is to approximate the mean distributionm t from below bym t and from above bym t . To do this, we wish the following condition to hold:
The above reasoning is particularly meaningful when σ = 0, in which case we consider the following dynamics:
In the above system of equations, we have set
We are then in the position to establish the following result, which provides a lower bound for the value function in (12) when σ = 0.
Furthermore, the approximation error is upper bounded as established by the inequality below
Proof: Given in the Appendix.
B. Exponential Asymptotic Stability of Microscopic Dynamics
The stochastic differential equation describing the closedloop system has an exponentially and asymptotically stable equilibrium. To see this from (26), (27) rewrite the dynamics for x t in (21) as
and consider the following assumption, ensuring that the evolution of the state is bounded from above by an exponential decay. Assumption 2: There exists κ > 0 such that
The analysis is then performed within the framework of stochastic stability theory [19] . To this end, consider the infinitesimal generator
and the Lyapunov function V (x) = x 2 . The stochastic derivative of V (x) is obtained by applying (40) to V (x), which yields
Proposition 7.1-[ [19] ]: Let Assumption 2 hold. If V (x) ≥ 0, V (0) = 0 and LV (x) ≤ −ηV (x) onQ := {x : V (x) ≤ } for some η > 0 and for arbitrarily large , then the origin is asymptotically stable "with probability one," and
for some ψ > 0. From Proposition 7.1, we have the following result, establishing exponential stochastic stability of the mean-field equilibrium. 
for some ψ > 0.
C. Mean-Field Equilibrium for Macroscopic Dynamics
Let Assumption 2 hold. We can approximate the mean-field equilibrium, which is captured by the evolution ofm t over the horizon (0, T ], as follows:
which yields the upper bound form t
Essentially, the inequality above describes converging linear dynamics which upper bound the time evolution ofm t , for all t ∈ (0, T ]. As a result
Actually, we can derive a differential equation describing the evolution of the mean distribution which represents a bound, namely
The equation above corresponds to saying that the mean distribution converges exponentially to zero in absence of stochastic disturbances (the Brownian motion), under the assumption that ρ is strictly negative.
VIII. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this section, we present numerical studies of the robust mean-field game with dynamics (31). In particular, we study in more detail the numerical example introduced in [13] . After computing optimal controls and worst-case disturbances using the heuristic method illustrated earlier, we simulate the macroscopic evolution of the population of players. Consider a system consisting of n = 10 3 indistinguishable players, where each player seeks to minimize a cost functional of the form (2) subject to an adversary disturbance, i.e., consider Problem 1. Note that for this scalar problem, we use the same notation as in Section VII, i.e. S(m t ) = sm t . An approximate solution to the mean-field game is found using the method introduced in Section V. The matrix
, is the positive definite solution to the algebraic Riccati equation (25) . The resulting control (26) and the disturbance   TABLE II  SIMULATION PARAMETERS   TABLE III (27) are adopted using this solution. The set of states is discretized and numerical results are obtained using the algorithm in Table III . The quantities σ(x t ) and μ determine the influence of the Brownian motion B t and the disturbance ζ t , respectively. In this example consider the case in which σ(x t ) is constant, i.e., σ(x t ) = σ and we set μ = σ. Simulations have been run for two different values of σ, namely σ 0 = 0, σ 1 = 0.1. The selection σ = σ 0 corresponds to the case in which there is no disturbance and dynamics (1) is deterministic. The simulations have also been run for two different values of s, namely s 1 = 0.5 and s 2 = 1.5. Note that large values of s correspond to large penalties when congestion occurs. The remainder of the parameters are as shown in Table II . Fig. 2 shows the time histories of the states of the players with the weights s = s 1 (top row) and s = s 2 (bottom row) and the parameters σ = σ 0 (left column) and σ = σ 1 (right column). Fig. 3 shows the distribution, m t , of the players' states at different times for the four different selections of parameters. The initial and final distributions are indicated by the dashed and solid curves, respectively, whereas the distribution at intermediate times are denoted by the dotted curves. Fig. 4 shows the time histories of the mean,m t , (left) and the standard deviation (right) for s = s 1 (top) and s = s 2 (bottom). The solid curves correspond to σ = σ 1 whereas the dashed lines correspond to σ = σ 0 .
Note that in all four cases, the players successfully drive their states to zero. However, for a given value of the parameter s, the convergence is fastest in the absence of noise and disturbances, i.e. when σ = σ 0 . Fig. 5 shows the time histories of the control actions (26) of the players with s = s 1 (top row) and s = s 2 (bottom row), and σ = σ 0 (left column) and σ = σ 1 (right column). For the case in which σ = σ 1 , it is clear that when s = s 1 is selected the players put a larger effort at the beginning of the simulation than when s = s 2 is selected, and the same is true for σ = σ 0 . Since s 2 > s 1 , this implies that in the former case a larger penalty is incurred when congestion occurs and therefore one would expect the players to stall to avoid this, resulting in the convergence to the zero equilibrium being somewhat slower. The simulations are consistent with this, as for a given value of σ it takes more time for the players to drive their states to zero when the parameter s = s 2 is selected in place of s = s 1 .
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have illustrated robust mean-field games as a paradigm for crowd-averse systems. We have discussed these systems in the context of stock market, production engineering, and dynamic demand management in power systems. We have presented a new approximation method based on the extension of the state space.
We can extend our study in at least three directions. These include: i) the extension of the approximation method to more general cost functionals; ii) the study of the case with "local" mean-field interactions rather than "global" as in the current scenario; and iii) the analysis of crowd-seeking scenarios in contrast to the crowd-averse cases analyzed in this paper.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1:
We first prove condition (13) 
Differentiating with respect to u t gives
which yields (13 
